The article introduces the concept of hegemony to leadership theory, which ha<; developed mainly as a critique of hegemonic stability theory. We argue that it makes sense to combine the two theories by introducing the concept of 'size' into ncolibcral thinking about International Political Economy. We accept the neo-institutional hypothesis that a hcgcmon is not needed to provide public goods, and de monstratc with non-cooperative games how multiple leaders may jointly provide public goods. A gamcthcoretic model is developed illustrating with Na<;h equilibria the conditions under which a hcgcmon rationally switches from hegemony to leadership. It also shows why follow ers rationally switch from free-riding in their consumption of the public goods to taking part in leading, in the sense of contributing to covering the cost of the production of the public goods .
! lntroduction 1
Hegemonic stabilit y theory ha<; over the la<;t two decades emerged a<; one of the predominant theories within interna tional relations theory and internat ional political economy. Briefly, it holds that a dominant actor uses its power to create internati onal economic regimes, most no tably the lnt crnational Monetary Fund<; in finance and exchange-rate politics, and the General Agreement ofTariffa and Trade. Draw ing on the theory of public good<;, the hegemonic stability theory argues that only a dominant actor, a hcgcmon , ha<; the interest and capacity to maintain the stability of an open internat ional economic system (Kindlcbcrgcr 1976; Keohane/ Nye 1977: 44) . Stated boldly, the advocates of the theory a<;sumc that a single hegemonic power creates a stable international economic order by providing international public good<; . The theory also a<;scrts that the decline of the hcgcmon lead<; to global economic instabili ty and to rcgionalization of int ernationa l economic affairs (Kindlebcrgcr 1986).
Hegemonic stability theory ha-; also received criticism for its various limitations, such a-; limitations in the applicability of the public-goods hypothesis. Critics suggest that collective action on the part of small groups in the international system may be possible (Snidal 1985a; Gowa 1989; 307) and argue that the provision of openness and stability in the world political economy implies the supply of cxcludablc rath er than public goods (Conybcarc 1984) . In both respects it is crucial to note that ther e are different versions of hegemonic stability theory. Keohane (1980) and, in particular, Lake (1993) have distinguished between a deterministic theory of hegemony and a far less deterministic leadership theory. The crucial point separating both theories is the possibility of international cooperation, defined as change in the behavior of actors in response to the actual or anticipated preferences of other actors through a process of policy coordination (Keohane 1984; 51; Milner 1992: 467) . The distinguishing feature between hegemonic and leadership theory lies in their explanation of international stabilit y and int ernational institutions. While hegemonic theory relics upon power differences, ncolib cral cooperation theory considers international regimes constituted by international cooperation.
This article illustrates the possibility of introducing a concept of power and the notion of hegemony into leadership theory, thus uniting a couple of previously competing perspectives. Most important, in applying game-theoretic models, the article both rationalizes the strategic shift of followers from free-riding to takin g part in leading, and shows the exact sense in which interaction between leaders occurs. In the international relations literatur e, several simultaneous leaders arc often referr ed to a-; cooperating, while cooperation is defined a-; the adjustment of policies between severa l countries. Howeve r, not to obfuscate matters unn ecessarily, we try to avoid the term since game theory distinguishes between cooperative and non -cooperati ve games. W c mak e no reference to cooperative game theory. If two or three actors arc all adopting a strat egy of leading, they do not do so because of binding agreements but because this const it utcs a Na.:;h equilibrium in a non-coop erative game. Subsequently, we discuss the nature of conflict in joint-lead ership models, stemming from the second-ord er problem of whi ch actors contribute to the production of the public good. The main objective of this article is to show how various kinds of games between a hc gcmon and followers or between a grou p oflcadcrs can be used to describe the changing structure of postwar int ernatio nal political economy, distinguishing betwee n different epochs, 1945 -1950, 195 1-1970, 1971-1995 . [Page 38]
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Section 2 provides background material, introduces the theory of hegemonic stabilit y, focusing especia lly on the concept of public goods in international political econom y, and discusses briefly its ncolibcra l critiqu e. Section 3 presents a game-th eoretic model of hegemony and joint leadership. Section 4 ana lyzes the model, illustra tes the changing equilibria in postw ar world po litics, and discuss es the United States' hegemonic decline and the emergence ofjoint leadership. Section 5 considers further implication s of parametric changes within the model. Section 6 discusses coercive and benevolent hegemony and leadership. Section 7 provides an exhaustive characterization of all possible equilibria given the three strategics hegemon, leader, follower for differ ent costs of producing the public good. Section 8 evaluates the prospects for prediction and the quest for international order.
The Theory of Public Goods in International Political Economy
For more than three decades since the publication of Morgenthau's seminal work Politics among Nations (Morgenthau 1948 (Morgenthau / 1973 , the dominant theory of international relations, realism, was based on the assumption that international politics takes place within the shadow of war (Aron 1962; 6) . The anarchical international system and especially the absence of an authoritative government creates a permanent threat to all countries, which have to rely on the means they can generate and the arrangement they can mak e for them<;elves (Waltz 1979; 111) . Therefore, to ensure their survival and independence in the long run, countries have a predominant interest in avoiding a loss in their relative capabilities even in the short run. In consequence, realism argues, economic well-being is not the prime inter est of countries. Only if their survival is assur ed can countries seek other goals among which welfare hold<; a prominent role (Carr 1946; 145; Waltz 1979; 126; Grieco 1990; 39) .
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Arguing from thes e point<; of view, realism postulates a mercantilist world economic system a<; a natural consequence of international politics. While seeking to avo id relativ e losses, countries turn out to be anxious about the distribution of benefits and they are therefore very pessimistic about the possibility of international cooperation. N cvcrthclcss, cooperation is considered a necessary condition for the existence of a lib era l international trading system . A liberal international economic order presupposes the j oint and, to som e extent, coordinated political action of countries.
The resulting gap between realis t expectations and the observable reali ty of postwar economic politics wa<; not discussed until Charles Kindlcbcr gcr (1973) analyzed the great depression and concluded that there is a crucial relationship between globa l economic stability and the existence of a single leader , a country which provides international public goods. Public goods arc the kind of good<; where exclusion of consumers is impossibl e and consumption by one actor docs no t ex haust its availabili ty for other actors. In international economi c affairs an open trading system, well-d efined prop erty rights, com mon standard<; of mca<;urcs including international money, consistent macroeconomics policies, proper action in ca-;e of economic crisis, and stabili zed exchange rates ill are said to be public goods (Kindlcbcrgcr 1981) .
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It is not surprising that the foundations of the 'theory of hegemonic stability ' were developed by an economist. Ever since David Hume the economics profession ha-; been fully aware that a liberal international economic order is in the interest of all countri es. However, the theory still break-; with cla-;sic liberal political economy (Frey 1984: 15-20) . Countries may prefer protectionism if other countries do not reciprocate. David Ricardo's theorem of comparative advantage argues that free trade is in the interest of countries even if other actors do not liberalize their trade regimes. The theory of hegemonic stability is not a liberal theory in the sense of neocla-;sical economics. All the same, it is less mcrcantilistic and therefore closer to the liberal economic tradition than realism had been before. Furthermore, the notion of free trade being a public good is nowadays much more plausible than Ricardo's theory, which a-;sumcd capital to be nationally bounded.
The idea that a liberal international economic order is ba-;ed on reciprocity is crucial for the analysis of international political economy. If we a-;sumc, contrary to Ricard o, that the reciprocal structure is considered a fair approximation of the world economy, then it follows that a common interest in an open and stable world economy does not necessarily lead to the provision of public good-; since all actors have an incentive to free-ride (Olson 1965) . The public-good-; analysis of international political economy gained promin ence parallel to the a-;cent of regime analysis. Regimes, international institutions, and the decision-making procedures which led to them, have been considered to serve the interest of all countries. How ever, in the absence of external enforcement, countries arc reluctant to negotiate international regimes since all actors have an incentive to free-ride. Stated game-theoretically, defection is the dominant strategy of countries.
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A-; Mancur Olson ha-; argued, the probability that public goods (includin g those constituting a liberal international economic order) will not be provided is hi gh, if the number of actors is large. According to Olson, one way to solve the problem is to introduc e selective incenti ves. If a 'private good' is unavoidabl y linked to the public good, the latter may result a-; a by-product. Another explanation of the origins and persistence of collective action empha-;izes the role of a dominan t power LlJ. Early contributions to this theory (Wagn er 1966; Breton/ Breton 1969; Frohlich/ Oppenheimer/ Young 1971) were appreciated by Olson (1971) , but considered valid only if the imaginative leaders were to find selective incentives:
A leader or entrepreneur, who is generally trusted (or feared), or who can guess who is bluffing in the bargaining, or who can simply save bargaining time, can sometimes work out an arrangement that is better/or all concerned. . . There is no certainty, and often not even a presumption, that an entrepreneur will sometimes be able to work out an arrangement that is agreeable to the parties concerned . . . When the group in need of a collective good is sufficiently large, an entrepreneur cannot possibly provide an optimal supply of the good through bargains or voluntwy cost -sharing agreements with those in the group. (Olson 1971: 176-177) Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser argue in their economic theory of alliances that in the provision of collective goods there is a tendency for the largest member to bear a disproportionately large share of the costs (Olson/ Zeckhauser 1966) . Natural leaders gain more from the provision of public goods and they place a higher absolute value upon it. Likewise, it can be argued that hegemons are more interested in international economic stability and openness and will therefore construct international regimes serving this end.
Even though hegemonic theory originated in the work of an economic historian, it is nevertheless hardly surprising that realism has adopted the power-based theory of public goods with only slight differences. Most important, political scientists argue that hegemons create liberal international economic orders not from altruism but from th eir own self-interest in open markets (Stein 1984: 357) . According to Robert Keohane (Keohane 1980; Keohane 1984: 31) two statements are central for the realist theory of international stability: First, order in world politics is created by a single great pow er, a hegemon, who will stabilize the world economy (Kindleberger 1973: 305; Krasner 1976) . Second, cooperation, the mutual adjustment of policies, depends on the perpetuation of hegemony, since the dominant power must enforce the rules and institutions.
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Deviating from Mancur Olson's formal theory, realism assumes different constraints and capabilities of actors (Kindleberger 1976: 57) . Countries simply differ in power, size, and wealth, and they therefore have different interests. How countries choose between their options depends strongly upon their position within the international system (Krasner 1976). Thi s position is determined by economic factors such as availability of capital, the size of the internal marke t, and a competitive advantage in the production of manufactured goods. To be considered hegemonic, a country must have access to crucial raw material, control major sources of capital, main tain a large mark et for imports, and hold an absolute advantage in the production of advanced goods and services (Keohane 1984: 33) .
From time to time through history, a hegemon emerges (Kennedy 1987) which has a strong incentive and the capabilities to produce a liberal world economic order. Since the hcgcmon ha<; efficient production capabilities, the dominant power will be the primary beneficiary of a free international economic system (Wallerstein 1980: 38) . More importantly, the hcgcmon also ha<; the ability to 'punish' defectors (Alt/ Calvert/ Humes 1988: 446) . If the dominant power also desires an open world economy, this power accepts its hegemonic role and stabilizes international economic relations and coerces other countries, i.e. followers, to open their economics a<; well. The hcgcmon might also tolerate the free-riding of small countries (Kindlcbcrgcr 1976: 19) . Therefore, the theory of hegemonic stability rests on a simple causal relationship, namely that a lib eral and stable world economic system requires a single great power (Kindlcbcrgcr 1973: 305) .
Consequently, if no hcgemon exists, the public good of international economic stability will not be provided.
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This argumentation wa<; challenged by the ncolibcral theory of international cooperation, namely by Duncan Snidal (Snidal 1985a) . Following Robert Keohanc's ,1/ier Hegemony (Keohane 1984 ) , Duncan Snidal argues convincingly that a small group of cooperating actors, what we refer to a<; 'joint leaders', can replac e a hegemon, thus jointly providing international public goods. Openness, therefore, can arise or be maintain ed in the absence of a hcgcmon. Leadership theory, a<; David Lake (1993) coined this research program, is able to argue, without referring to hcgemons, that joint leaders may provide intern ational public goods. Countries arc able to adjust their economic policies through a process of policy coordination. The problem that countries face in regard to the production of stability and wealth in the world political economy is dominantl y expressed by the prisoners' dilemma (Conybcarc 1984) , which is considered to resemble the lo gic of collective action (Brams 1975: 144; Taylor 1976: 17-25 ; Hardin 1982 : 25-30, Morrow 1994b .
For Conybcarc, the analytical shift from pure public-goods theory to the prison ers' dilemma is crucial since he denies that free trade, for example, is a public good. First, he stresses that the principle of non-excludability is not given. Countries may hind er economic subjects from one particular country from entering their markets. Tariff<; and even more so quota<; can be employed against different actors to quite different extent<;. Secondly, Conybeare points out that there is rivalry in the consumption of the benefits from free trade (Conybcare 1984: 9). It is therefore, a<; Timoth y McKcown puts it, "not very sensibl e to view the international system a<; isomorphic with an economic system of perfect competition" (McKcown 1983: 78) .
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The possibility of monitoring the behavior of other actors and the resulting rivalry and cxcludability explain not only that the burdens of providing a public good can be shared; they also make clear that the benefits from an international public good may not be equal. This is crucial since it is quite common to a<;sumc that larger countries in general gain more from an open world economy than small countries do (although other factors such a<; the [ export+import ]/GDP ratio also play a role). Therefore, one should expect that larger countries have a higher incentive to invest in international openness (.Kra<; ncr 1976; 322) . However, by trying to maximize its own payoffa, a hcg emon serves th e benefits of other countries, and international public goods might be created a<; a by-product of the hcgcmon's production of private goods (Russett 1987; 222) .
The problem Conybcare refers to depends heavily on the dichotomous notion of goods being either purely public or purely private. Conybcare is correct in stating that a liberal economic order and international economic stability arc not pure public goods, but neither arc they pure private goods Ifl In all ca<;cs but monetary affairs the possibility of excluding single actors exist<;. However, this possibility is costly, for example in regard to the monitoring of norm-deviant behavior and to enforcement mca<; urcs. Quit e different from th e production of private goods, the exclusion of other actors requires a political act. Therefore, the definition of a collective good in the narrow sense is not met. On the other hand, without costly discriminatory mca<;urcs, openness and stability come close to resembling public goods. Moreov er, if the enforc ement of a coop erativ e agreement is costly (Oyc 1985: 15) , the policy mca<;urcs themselves become a public good (Gowa 1989; 315) .
It is currently undisputed that the connection between hegemony and openness in the world economy is more complex than previous contributions to the theory have so far considered. But it is also widely appreciated that an interrelati on betw een power distribution and the maintenanc e and creation of int ernational institu tions docs exist. Therefore, the hegemonic and the leadership strands of argum ent about int ernational economic stability arc not nec essarily in competition. The present article shows that they arc ea<;i ly and :fruitfully linked if one presupposes both, that is both the possibility of a hcgcmon a<; well a<; several joint leaders. In this regard we distinguish between hegemonic and lead ership provision of public goods. Joint leadership between two or several large powers is possible, but unilateral, heg emonic provision of int ernational public goods demands less transaction costs and will pay off for all actors und er certain circumstances.
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More important, the following game -theoretic model develops simple explanations , illustratin g how and why a hegemonic system turns into a joint-leadership system. It indicates the conditions which presuppose unilateral or collective action. In addition, we discuss the consequences of joint-leadership systems in general, pointing out the relevance of disagreement and political struggle among second-dominant powers, namely the EC and Japan, over the participation in covering the cost of producing international public goods. These a . .. pect.., , which resemble either a battle-of-the-sexes or a coordination situation, arc ignored in the dominant prisoners' dilemma model of international politics, which focuses on commitment, enforcement and strategic interaction.
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J, A Game-Theoretic Model of Hegemony and Joint Leadership
Game theory, or more specifically non-cooperative game theory, provides a powerful tool for the analysis of international affairs since strategy is the essence of politics. The strength of game theory involves focusing on strategic interaction betwe en two or more players, where each player ha.., a set of strat egies available, and where the payoff to each player depends on the strategies chosen by all the players. Contrary to play against "dead nature," where a player maximizes his payoff in a given, fixed environment, in game theory each player seeks to maximize his payoff given that all the other players also seek to maximize their respective payoff..,. Hence in an n-player game, we get n simultaneous maximization problems to solve. The most famous and :frequently used solution concept in game theory, which we will also use in this article, is the Na..,h equilibrium. A Na..,h equilibrium is a state of affairs where no player ha.., an incentiv e to deviate unilat erally from his chosen strategy. That is, he can not improve his payoff by deviatin g unilaterally. Hence we also have an equilibrium e.g. if two players can both improv e their payoff.., by deviating in a certain manner, while a third player receives a lower payoff. In noncoopcrativc game theory, binding agreement.., between the players arc thus not allowed. Each player seeks instead to maximize his own payoff disregarding the payoffa others receive. There arc :frequently mor e than one equilibrium, and the players typically have different preferences between these, and try to coordinate on one they prefer. Which equilibrium is chosen may depend on historical precedent, :framing effects, saliency, anchoring and adjustment procedures, etc. In world politics and international political economy game theory is used to illustrate the structure of decision-making of countries confronted with collec tive dilemma ... . Unfortunately, game theory very seldom takes into account that actors differ. The game-theoretic approach to international politics ha.., been restricted to equal-ac tor games and treat..,, a.., Duncan Snidal puts it, "very large and very small ones a.., equal partners in a prisoners' dilemma" (Snidal 1985b: 47) . As a result, its direct usefulness to the analysis of international relations and more particular to the analysis of the consequences of power distribution is limited. This restriction obviously limits also the game-theoretical analysis of hegemonic decline. Furthermor e, it is quite common for international-relations theoris ts to restrict game-theoretic models to their simplest form, namely 2x2 matrixes. To illustrate the concepts of hegemony, free-riding, and joint leadership, however, a more complex model is required. We present in this section five a<;sumptions underlying the model and the model itself, which is able to illustrate much more than previous models how a decline in interest in international public goods leads to an incrca<;c in joint action. The hegemonic decline of a leading actor, therefore, should lead to more 'cooperation' a<; this phra<;c is used in international relations theories. In section 4 we analyze the implications of changing the one variabl e in the three-actor model, namely the size of each country, and in section 5 we discuss the implications of changing four parameters in the model, namel y production costs of public goods, transaction cost<;, and the sharing rules of the hegemon and of the leaders.
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We use size to reflect a country's interest in stable international economic relations. Ev en though small countries may profit more in relative terms, larger econo mics import and export more in absolute terms and they also participate more in the production of international liquidity. The interest in international public goods and the gains from th e provision of these, therefore, depends to some extent on relati ve size.
In order to keep the model a<; simple a<; possible, we introduce a 3x2x2-model which is ba<;cd on the following five a<;sumptions:
Assumption 1
Public goods arc produced if a minimum of either one hcgcmon or two leaders exist. ill This is a rigid assumption and it may seem to be implau sible. But since we introduce this assumption to a three-actor model, it can be reformulated so that contribution to covering the costs by a suitably chosen majority of the actors involved leads to the production of international public goods.
Assumption 2
Only the US ha<; so far been capable of acting a<; a hcgcmon. The EC and Japan can at most act a<; leaders . Ther efore, the US ha<; three strategics: to act a<; hcgcmon (H), to lead (L), or to follow (F). The EC and Japan can either lead (L) or follow (F).
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The literature holds that only the largest countries are willing to act as hegemons (Lake 1984: 150) . The model allows for the assumption that either the EC or Japan acts a-; a hcgcmon. However, the model also indicates that this will lead to huge losses, which can be referred to a-; 'imperial overstretch'. To keep the model a-; simple as possible, we ha ve opted for a 3x2x2-matrix instead of a 3x3x3-matrix, a-;suming that only the largest actor can be ahcgemon. In the general analysis in section 7, the EC and Japan are also allowed to be hegemons.
Assumptio11 3
There is costly excludability of consumption. However, countries with 'larger economics' are likely to receive a higher payoff from the consumption. We roughly indicate the payoff from the consumption as the size of a country's economy relative to the aggregated size of the OECD economics, that is us/oecd, cc/occd, and j/occd.
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The empirical relevance of this a-;sumption is open to discussion, though we consider it to be an approximation to reality. For any model a tradeoffha-; to be struck between simplicity, generality, empirical support, etc. Using the empirical data available today, it is not clear that an alternative to a-;sumption 3 is more appropriate, because a multiplicit y of other factors interact in many different directions. In the light of this, there is virtue in simplicity . However, it is important to note that a-;sumption 3 can be vari ed in any way for which one might find an argument or empirical support without alterin g the deeper nature of our argument presented in this article. Assumption 3 nevertheless needs a few comments . Competing concept-; would argue that it is not size but world mark.ct integration that is causing an interest in a stable and open world economy. In this regard, there are both a relativ e and an absolute mea-;uremcnt of world mark.et int egration. The relative one is called openness and is calculated a-; exports plus imports divided by th e countries nominal gross domestic product. This a-;sumption would lead to the hypothesis that highly specializ ed and small countries like Sweden (which ha-; an export/GDP ratio about five times that of the US), Taiwan, and Korea have a larger inter est in stabili zing the liberal world economy than large countries such a-; the US and Japan. The absolute indices of world mark.et integration are simply exports. Countri es which export mor e good-; and services have an higher inter est in a liberal trading system. Again, ther e arc good rca-;ons to doubt this. Countries with a highly specialized export indust ry that ha-; a world mark.et monopo ly have no interest in open trading structur es since they arc able to sell their good-; anyway. The oil-exporting countries arc a good example for this ca-;c. Furth ermor e, even ifw e consider exports a-; the ba-;is of an inter est in international public good-;, the US, EC, and Japan can be considered the dominant actors. The only differenc e would be that the three actors arc more similar, which lead-; to political results that we discuss in more detail in sections 7 and 8. There may be a better mca-;urcm ent of the payoff., a cmmtly gains from the world economy than size. However. there i, no obvi,m,ly better. simpler way to measure this.
Ass11mplfun 4
Both the political im,ccss to reach an agreement on prnviding a public good and the coordination of policies arc ca;tly. Ifwc denote the total costs ofim,ducing a public good as c.(c+c 1 -.). where c is the cost ofhcgcmony if there arc one hcgcmon imd two followcIS, c1· arc transaction costs of coonlinatingpolicics. and Cs, Oc,1Js a sharingmlc specifying what fraction of the costs each a,.,·1or incuIS. TI1c transaction costs arc then c 1 =0 if the public good is im, ... ,Jd.cd by a hcgcmon and c 1·>0 'IN;hcn there is joint lcadcIShip.
The pra.b:tction cost of an international public good indmlcs the political-economic prnccss of cmnlinating macrocconomic policies. It is pcrl.ui:ps impossible to measure this cost exactly. and it may make sense to a,si:ime that this cost is higher in the early y"l!ars of im international regime than in later ones. However. international regimes do not work perfectly immediately upon implementation. They have to be maintained. which requires continued input of political and economic resources. The same C!lll be said a'b.-ntt transaction ca;ts. which inch1tlc the costs of reaching an agreement. the costs of monitoring the political action of cooperative a,., .. tors. and ti~ cost of agreeing to maintain an international regime.
Ass11111plfun 5
A ihllowcr docs not take part in covering tl!c cost ofprodi:tcing tl!c public good. This is self.evident since a free-rid.er docs not change its policies lmtrathcr gains from the policy changes of oilier actors.
Let 'l:l'i> a,si:imc ihr cxpositional convenience linearly incrca,ing transaction cosl,.
is the number o flcad.cIS, and a is a parameter .[(.ij . This means tl!at tl!c more actoIS arc involved. tl!c more diffic·ult it is to reach an agreement !llld tl!c higher arc the monitoring costs. Hcnre it is easier to integrate a limited mtmbcr of similar CO'l:tnlrics tl!an to integrate the world economy.
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The sliitringrnlc we ·(L,c for the hcgcmon's cost is c1= c.;,=I for FO. c,.:=.2/J for l=L imd c.._ = IJ1 for 1=1. We do not need it frmction to specify this sliming which is cxht«L,tivcly dcscn"be d in the prcvimL , sentence. However. in onlcrto tt00mmtmorc conveniently for the sliming in ourmotlcL let ·(L , oh.oose it f(motion thllt goes through these three points. An t1pproprilltc function is where we multiply by IO to get conveniently s ixcd pll)'off.,.
The P":'Off for being it lca.lcr is
The payoJT for follo~ing is
Obviously, it is more expensive to act as hcgcmon than to act as a leader. And it is more expensive to lead than to follow. Btrt since tl1c pro,ision of an international public good is a positive-sum game for all countries involved, it may pay for cmmtrics to be a hcgcmon or to participate in joint leadership. The requirements of these constellations arc discussed in the following sections. 
,<\nalvsis of the l\'lodel
Japan foltows J apan leads it is costly for tl1c VS to choose tl1c lcatlcrship option unless it coerces tl1c EC to switch fiom followingtolcading simnltoococL~ly. ·n1crcfore. a d.ccliningrelativc ad~'ll1lu1gc may lead to a political stmgglc between tl1c hcgcmon imd tl1c second nmking powers c~-cn before the hegemonic period comes to a lie.finite end. Since coercion is costly even for a domimmt power and more so for a llcclining power. the hcgcmon may opt to ignore tl1c p_,ssibility of coercive bcmlcnsharing.
Furthermore, the model also illustrates that the hegemonic strategy [H,F ,F] is not just th e historical equilibrium but also has a higher 'collective payoff for all involved . This is a plausible assumption at least for the period from 1945 to 1965. What is important for th e production of order in the international system, since there arc just two equilibria and both lead to the production of a public good, is that the public good continues to be provided even though political struggle may occur between the US and the EC over th e participation of the latter. Game-theoretically, Table 4 .2 has only one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies providing the public good, viz [L,L,F] =(0.7, 0.2, 1.5) which means that the EC has an intere st in emerging as a leader and accepting part of the cost of producing the public goods, while the US changes from being a hegemon to being a leader. Japan still has a dominant strate gy in following. Note that [H,F,F] =(-0.2, 3.5, 1.5) is no longer an equilibrium as hegemoni c leadership becomes too costly for the US . Table 4 .2 also has a Nash equilibrium where all actors choose the strategy of following, thus indicating that the probability of the public good being produced diminishes. This situation corresponds to a coordination game between the US and the EC. If the US and the EC agree upon the mutual destructibili ty of th e situat ion should both opt for following, then negotiations and eventually joint action may be expected to follow. The emergence of an [F ,F ,F] equilibrium indicates that jointlead ership systems are much more vulnerable against instabili ty than hegemonic systems. In cases of emergency or crisis it is not at all clear whether joint action will be achi eved. Moreover, a time gap between he gemonic and collective leadership systems should be expected since there is a conflict between the former hegemon and the former follow er over the condition s and the distribution of costs between major actors in a jointlcadcrs hip system. It is at this point cruc ial that countries learn that structura l conditions have changed and that thorough analysis is required. The m.xlcl disc(lsscd so for has a mimbcr of satisfoctmy implications, which in general ilhlstratc the postwar dc"'l!!opmcnt of international political economy. Fig. 4 .l shows the chronological dcvclopmcri t from l 945 to 199 5 of fh.c payoff to the US of choosing H (hegemony) when bofh. the EC amlJa:pan choose to follow; fh.c payoff to fh.c US of choosing L (joint lc~lcrship) given that cifh.cr the EC or fa:pan choose L; and the payoff to tl1c US of choosing F when tl1c public good is not Jm1"idcd. tliat is. if citl1cr EC or I apim or botl1 choose F.
ObscT'l.'i! in Fig. 4 .l tl1at tl1c curve for tl1c US payoff for hegemony goes tlm,ngh tl1c poinLs (1960, 0.8) imd (1975, -0. 2), and tl1at fJ1c cnrvc for tl1c US payoff for joint lc&lcrship goes fhmng'h. tl1c points (1960, l.7) !llld (1975, 0.7 : 
. Between 1945 u:n d 1950 there was no political struggle between the US u:n d other ootors over the di.~tribution of costs in the provi~ion of intcmu:tionul rn,blio goo,l. Table 4A . ·nw is, the game changes frnm a coonlination game in Table 4 .3 to a battle-of-the-sexes game in Table 4 .4, the latter introducing distributional conflict o~'l!r who is to provide the public good. Table 4A shows tliat the hegemonic role of the VS had been im historical equilibrium, not ma'!:imizing its utility.
Since 1970 the payoff to tl1c VS for choosing tl1c hegemonic strategy h!~s fallen sl1ort of the payoff for choosingtl1c followcr-stratcgy. lilcrcasing costs imd decreasing capabilities h!IVc led to a situation in wi1ich tl1c lt!gemon ll!ls opted to contribute only partly (in the scrisc oflcading short ofl1cgcmony) or not to contribute at all (in the sense of following, i.e. tlcfccting) to covcringtl1c o.;st oftl1c pmd:uction of the public good. ·nus situation is shown in Tablc4.5. Table 4 .4 has been replaced bya new coonliilation game, where the actors 1111~'1! to coordinate on the strategy combinations [f ;fj and [L;L j. Although tlt! latter might seem most appropriate, it took about five years to realiz& it, probably mainly bccimsc ofhistorically entrenched inertia and rigid pcro::ptioos oftl1c situation in international relations. first, tl1c EC was reluct1111t to opt for joint lc!lllcrship since it hoped tliat the VS would prncccd in its hegemonic rnlc ofprn~'itliilgthc public good of openness !llld stability in economic affairs. Secondly, realizing tliat even a minimum degree of lc!lllcrsllip in the fo1m of coopcrnti~'I! bcll!l~'ior is ~,:tlncrnblc to exploitation, the VS opted for tl1c vczy opposite ofhcgcmonic lc!lllcrsllip, viz a follower strategy, yickliilgthc payoff [l,lj. ·n1c [f;fj stratcgyduringtl1c period 1970-1975 Our model allows for changes of one '-'llriablc, country-size, and the four pimimct...'Th: production costs of public goO\ls, c, the transaction costs, C1; and the sharingrnlcs of the hcgemon, c,J,Hfh.l). and of the lca.:lcrs. C.i(Hfh.l). Additionally. assumption I in section,\ abont the 1ninimum requirement for prndncing a public good can be changed. Onr main concern in the preceding section has been to diJrcrcntiatc between the siZJ! of the actors.
Rest of World
In this section we disCtlss changes in the cfcT ratio and changes in the (c+c1}{tls+cc+j) ratio. It is also possible to '-'llly the shape of the transaction-<:osts function(:\. I). although this docs not change the natnre of our argument and will thns not be disCtlsscd farther. 'Moreover. it is possible to '-'llly the distribution of costs between the actors and to change the minilmnn requirements for the provision of a public good. W c can replace the assumption I in section ,, that either one hcgcmon or at least two joint leaders arc sufficient to prodncc an international public good with the assrnnption that the prnvision of the pnblic good requires a minimrnn of input. The latter two modifications arc disCtlsscd in section 7. All changes have theoretical as well as c1npirical i1nplications. with richer implications if parameters '-'llly concurrently.
Most important for our study, the general structure of the game, which strongly advocat es bilateral leadership, docs not change unless the size of the Japanese econom y rises well above .25 and/or the size of the dominant actor dccrca<;cs to about . 30 . This implies that joint leadership of more than two countries only pays if the actors are similar or even equal in size. Tripartite leadership is unlikely to occur even when the public good yields a high payoff and the costs, including transaction costs, of its production are low.
[Page 65] Journal of World-Systems Research
Transaction costs originate from policy changes and international negotiations. They emerge when actors have to identify the possible effects of their action, when they arc trying to identify their best option, and when actors arc bargaining about an agreement (Scharpf Mohr 1994: 46) . These a<;pects can but need not be quit e costly. Gen erally, one should expect that rising transaction cost<; incrca<;c the probability that a public good will not be provided. In our model decrca<;ing transaction costs lead to a greater number of possible equilibria in which the public good is provided. Most important to note, even in the period after 1970, a<; shown in Table 5 .1, the [F,F,F] option is no longer an equilibrium if transaction costs arc low. Instead, the US ha<; an incentiv e to provide the public good unilaterally if it is unable to coerce the EC or Japan to lead jointly. Therefore, the model implicates a sharp incrca<;e in the probability that the public good will be produced in the event of the transaction costs Cr being low . Th e lower the cost c of producing the public good, the more probable is unilateral or joint leadership. A<; we discuss in more detail over the next sections, a multiplicity of possible equilibria leads to a second-order problem of which equilibria to choose. There will be disagr eement between the actors, stemming from the different distribution of net gains from th e different equilibria. While the US is indifferent in regard to which actor it will share the leadership rol e with, either the EC and Japan have a strong incentive to follow if the other actor (EC or Japan) leads. Between the EC and Japan there is a first-mover advantage in committing to follow , which involves letting the other bear the cost of leadership.
Conflict occurs not only between the EC and Japan, but also between Japan and the US a<; well a<; between the EC and the US if the US tries to coerce one of th e former to join in leadership. Considered from the EC's viewpoint, the preference structure is Pu stJap = 3 .5 > PustEC = 0.2 > Pus sole leader = 0. However, since Japan ha<; a dominant strategy of following for all public goods whose production and transaction costs c+c r exceed 3.0, the EC ha<; a weak incentive to lead. It is important to note, however, that the absence of transaction costs and low costs of the public good lead to a situation in which more than two Na<;h-cquilibria arc possible. With c=2.4 and no transaction costs, that is cr= O, our 3x2x2-model gives the payoff matrix in [Page 67] J()mr.,ll ()(W()rld-System~ R<~~eal'(:h lltc most coillrn"'i!rsial assumpti011 of onr mo,lcl. assumpti011 l of sccti011 :\, hokl, that the prnduction of an iiucrnational public good requires cilltcr 011c hcgemo11 or two lea.ten;. lltis assumpti011 was ltclpfttl i11 modeli11g Ute ch .. <\llgcs i11 U1e strategics of tltc hcgemOll aml tltc foll0>vcn; dnri11g hegemonic ,lcclitlc. H0>v-cvcr. tltis assumption is f.'-!T less c011vi11ci11g wl1e11 tltc 11ati:irc of joillt lca.lcrship is discnsscd.
lltcrc arc at least two '"'ti)'' ofclu111gi11g the mo,lcl i11 a manner tlmt allows for a disci:l,sion ofmiltimi:im requircmc11l, i11 the prnvisi011 of public goo,l,. fin;t. tltc rcquiremcllt tltat the cxistc11cc of aml tltc coonli11ation bctwcc11 two lciw.lcrs is sufficic11t for the prndncti011 of a public good can be relt!xcd or givc11 up. lltc requircmc11t tlmt tltrec acton; arc ncccsst!IY for tltc prnvisi011 of a public good implies tlmt the public good most prnbablywill not be prnvi,lcd if the tn1nsacti011 costs aml the prndncti011 cosl, of the public good arc lugh. 01tly if acton; arc more similar 111 size tlulll we have a~umcd. or acton;' sizes become more similar 111 tltc Jhtnrc. is tripartite lciw.lcn;lup likely to occi:rr.
[Page (,SJ J()11ma l ()( W()rld-Syste1,,~ R<~~eal'(:h lltc sccoml wttyof allowi11g for a doscr t!pJll\,ximati011 to reality i11voh'i!s tltc i11trndncti011 of a distributive JimctiOll ofpm,lncti011 o.;sl,. So far we hKVc a,srimcd ail equal distribution of costs between all actors in a joint-leadership group. A.., Yoichi Funabashi has shown, it is -at least in some issue-areas -possible to distribut e cost.., between actors unequally. In his analysis of exchange -rate management within the Group of 5 and the Group of 7, he pointed out that the distribution of intervention shares was a major source of political conflict. While in the first draft proposal ofjoint action the distribution was 25% for the US, 25% for Japan and 50% for the EC, the compromise plan proposed a share of 30% each for the US and Japan and 40% for the EC (Funabashi 1988: 20) . Incorporating these assumptions into our model while using the comparative sizes of 1985 from the Penn World Tables, we arrive at what resembles a prisoners' dilemma with [F,F,F] as the unique Nash equilibrium. However, with joint action, all actors can receive a higher payoff both collectively and individually. The distribution of costs within the European Community ha.., involved smaller shares for Great Britain, France and the smaller countries than it ha.., for Germany. It seems that Germany ha.., found this distribution unfair and ha.., thus not covered the cost in full. Hence it is hardly surprising that Germany ha.., later been accused of free-riding by th e US. Th e smooth cooperation of Japan, however, is not predicted by the model. The model predict.., that Japan should be much more reluctant to lead than ha.., actually happened. It is fca..,ible, however, that the US coerced Japan to lead, since the economic imbalanc es between both countries made Japan vulnerable to political pressure.
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Concluding this section, we now summariz e the implications of our model. The following hypoth eses emerge from the preceding analysis: l. Incr easing the cost c of producing the public good reduces the possibility for one single actor to act a.., a hcgcmon because this becomes too costly. lncr ea.., ing the cost of producing the public good, in response to a world economic crisis for exampl e, requires joint leadership even if the capabilities of the hcgcmon arc sufficient to stabilize international regim es in normal situations.
2. Decrea..,i ng the transaction costs CT of producing the public good increa..,es the likelihood of the emergence of joint leadership. In our model it incrca..,cs the number of Na..,h equilibria in which multiple leaders jointly provide the public good.
3. The possibility of distributing production costs of a public good among multiple actors incrca..,es the likelihood of joint leadership even though the situation still resembles a coordination game and distributive conflict might prevent actors from reaching a jointleadership equilibrium.
4. The number of actors participating in joint leadership depends predominantly on the minimum requirement for their production. In additi on, it is influenced by the shape of the transaction-cost function, CT in equation (3 .l) . If additional actors do not significantl y increa~e the transaction costs of decision-making, the probability of tripartite leadership incrca~cs.
Joint-leadership systems require an agrccmcn t between the members of a small or a 'kgroup' on every political action which needs policy coordination. Contrary to what is the ca~c for a hegemonic system, different interests have to be taken into account. This not only incrca~cs transaction costs, but also makes agreement problematic even if actors agree that a coordinated solution is in the interest of all actors. Considerations of this kind have led Robert Keohane to distinguish between harmony and cooperation (Keohane 1984: 51) . While harmony refers to a situation in which the pursuit of self-interest by one actor contributes to the interest of all, cooperation requires that conflicting viewpoints and actions arc brought into conformity:
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Cooperation therefore docs not imply an absence of conflict. On the contrary, it is typically mixed with conflict and reflects partially successful efforts to overcome conflict, real or potential. Cooperation takes place only in situations in which actors perceive that their policies arc actually or potentially in conflict, not where there is harmony. (Keohane 1984: 53-54) In other words, Keohane argues that cooperation is needed to overcome conflict stemming from uncoordinated policies that lead to suboptimal outcomes for all actors.
The situation Keohane ha~ in mind and analyzes resembles a typical prisoners' dilemma. Joint action can help the actors to achieve a better outcome if an institution is implemented. This allows for an ca~y observation of the noncoop crative behavior of actors and helps to enforce rules.
In a prisoners' dilemma an agreement on mutual cooperation should be ca~y to negotiate, but the enforcement of the norms is difficult. This is the rea~on why a strong institutional setting , a dominant group of countries which seek to enforce the agreement, may help to create and stabilize international regimes (Martin 1993: 99) . Howev er, from this perspective it is quite unclear why a hcgcmon should unilaterall y create and maintain international public goods. With the a~sistancc of other main actors it would be ea~ier to ensure rule compliance . A similar assumption hold~ for joint leadership exercised by a limited number of countries. We discuss this topic, ba~cd on the notion of transaction costs, in the following section. Returning to the a~sumption of equation (3 .2) that coercive hegemony is possible, we analyze the structural requirements, which lead to such a constellation in one issue-area.
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2, Coercive and Benevolent Hegemony and Leadership
The a-;sumption that multiple actors join in the production of public goods partly contradicts the empirical findings of hegemonic era-; a-; well a-; contemporary world politics. The central decision-making body for international economic leadership is the world economic summit. This institution embodies the United States, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy. Our model accounts for disagreement, since it a-;sumcs incrca-;ing transaction costs when the number of actors participating in the decision-making process incrca-;cs. Furthermore, our model also encapsulates a second and more political notion of disagreement: in all ca-;es in which more than one equilibrium leads to the provision of international public goods, we should expect political conflict over the proper way to produce it.
The analysis of our model ha-; led to the conclusion that the emergence ofj oint leadership yields multiple equilibria, implying that contemporary world politics docs not resemble a prisoners' dilemma but rather a coordination game emerging from an earlier battlc-of-thcscxcs game. In this ca-;e a-; well a-; in cla-;sical hegemonic constellations, actors can use power resources to cause other countries to participate in the production of int ernational public goods.
During the declining pha-;e of US hegemony, the main source of conflict ha-; been whether other countries, most notably European countries or Japan, should share the leadership role with the US. It had been possible for the US to force European countri es and Japan to share the burdens of international leadership. In current world politics, the main source of disagreement is rather which two leaders should contribute to the provision of international public goods, or whether trilateral leadership is appropriat e. The leaders can be selected 'randomly' or ba-;ed on their interest in special issue -area-;. Actors can also use power to change 'natural' leadership constellations. They can urge followers to participate in the production of an international public good.
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Pertaining to these issues, there is currently much ongoing debate regarding whether the leader acts benevolently or coercively. Beth and Robert Yarbrough (1992: 50), for example, state that the main source of disagreem ent within hegemonic stabilit y theory stems from the extent of benevolence or exploitation ( coercion) by the hcgcmon. The model in section 3 allows us to make a more succinct specification of whether the hcgcmon will act benevolently or coercively [lQJ . If we a-;sumc that coercion is more costly than benevolence, the cost of coercion can then be considered a-; part of the hegcmon's transac tion costs CThco=cT given in equation (3.1). We thus rewrit e (3.l) so that 12k c 171 ,.(h+I) = -(h+i -1) for h+I ~ I ,
5
( 6.1) where 1h c parameter k incrcit,cs as the cost of coercion incrcit,es. We it,,mne 1ha t 1he nutii:re ofhegemonio ooeroion of other ootors. ~vhether it is tlironghprovidingpositive incentives or negative su:notions , is snoh that the other actors get a h.ighcrpa: yoff from compliu:nce thun fu,m non-complfonce. Tite l1egemon will act bene,1olcntly if P(HB I h = 1,/= 0) > P(H 0 I h = 1,/ 1f (6 .4) is not satisfied, 1lte ltegcmon will coerce t>vo 01l1er actors nrtlter tlmn one to lead if. analogoiL,lyto (6.2) and (6..3 ), -c,k(H / 1,2)(c +c 171 ,,(3) ) >-c,k(H 11,l)(c +c 171 ,,(2) ) ' ((' 5 \. ) lnserting (6.1) into (6.5) for h=l u:nd resolving with regard t.; k gives that the hegemon will Coerce tM1 01her actors nrther flllm One to lead if let ·iL , as,rnne c=4.2.=2. l/5. lnserting tlte slmringrnk (.3.2.) into (6.4) u:n d (6.6) tlten implies tlurt tl\C hegcmon will oot benevolently ifk'>7/8 u:n d will ooeroe the 1:IYO otl\er actors t., lead if k<7!f.i. With a shi1Tingrnk csa(H /1,1,-2!.3 (it, befure) uml c,JH! 1 ,2.,-.3 !5, tlte ltegemon will act bene•'Olently ifk>7!8, will coerce one otlter actor to lead if 7 !.32.<k<7 !8, imd will coerce the i..~" other actors to lead ifk~7!.32.. With a sJu,ringrnle c,,.(H!l ,1,-.3!5 and o,,;,( H!l ,2.,-1/2. (ii;; before), the hegemon will act bcrie. 'Olcntly if k>7/6, will coerce one other actor to lead if 7/ 16<k<7/6, and will coerce the two other actors to lead if k<7/ 16. A hcgcmon therefore acts unilaterally if it considers the costs of coercion higher than the possible contribution of followers. The probability of coercion incrca~cs the more costly an international public good is and the lower the transaction costs are.
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The question of benevolence versus coercion is also relevant in a situation of joint leadership where hegemony is absent. Benevolent leadership occurs if a couple or a group of actors can produce the public good without other possible leaders since the institutional costs of rule enforcement exceed the enforceable contribution of followers.
Coercive leadership occurs if the cost of punishing defectors is outweigh ed by the contribution defectors make when they switch to cooperation. A ca~e of coercive leadership is the multilateral exchange-rate management within the institutional setting of the world economic summit between the Plaza and the Louvre agreement (Funaba~hi 1988) . lll]
An Exhaustive Characterization of the Equilibrium Strategies
This section provides an exhaustive characterization of all the possible equilibria for th e model in section 3: for four different costs c of producing the public good, that is c=4.2, c=4.8, c=6 and c=3.6, given transaction costs c r according to equation (3.l), that is given cr(2)=2.4 and cr(3)=4.8. The change we make in the assumption is to allow all three actors, the US, the EC and Japan, to choose between the three strate gics of bein g a hcgcmon, a leader or a follower. Both changes bring symmetry into the analysis and provide for a mor e timeless evaluation which is valid for any thre e actors, any of which may emerge as a future hcgcmon. We also assume for simplicity that us+cc+j =90=constant. A cost c=4.2 of producing the public good gives the equilibrium characteri zation in Fig. 7 Increasing tl~ cost c ofpl\1Lb:tcingtl1c public :;,;-ood to c=4.8 gives the equilibrium charnctcriz.ation in Fig. 7 .2. Fig. 7 .2 ilhL<;tratcs a more strict requirement fbr attaining a hegemonic cqnilibrhim. viz that an actor ha<; a si:z.c l!w;cr than I Oc=48. say •rr:F for tL<;>48. ·n1c HFF,LLF trnpczium in Fig. 7 .1 has moved leftward imd has been replaced by the tiny triangle far left in Fig. 7 .2 for the size of the VS being slightly larger than tL<;"'48 and the size of Japan being snffioicntly dose to j=O. ·n1c 'do-wn-w"aTLlly' directed triangle. giving the ·nniqnc defection equilibrium FFF. will cxpimd ctpwanl to ·tL\F'48 and do-w11ward to the point ( 18. 36.36 ). Further. the JTF;LLF parallelogram in Fig. 7 . I lHl<; moved leftward and been rephi,:cd bythc five-edged area to the left in Fig. 7.2 . Finally. the small HFF,LLF/Hff area to the left in Fig. 7.1 sttrrOttmlingthc point (45, 45, 0) ha<; lfaappearcd since hegemony is no longer possible when the size of an actor is less than 48.
Note especially that Fig. 7 .2 has fewer areas "with mnltiple cqnilibria than Fig. 7 .l. We fo1d that this is a general trend when the cost c ofprndncingthe pnblk good increases, The reason is that the more strict requirement for hegemony yiekt~ a smaller HFF area (if an act.or is ,nfficiently hw;e, which is less likely), a hw;er FFF area (if the act.or sizes converge, which is more likely), and very few areas where joint leadership alone or combined with a hegemony or a follower strategy is p_,ssible (if two a,., .. t.ors arc comparably lar<;e and the thinl actor is small, which also is less likely).
"'
Increasing the cost c ofprndncingthe pnblk :,;-ood forth er to c.aa(i leil4l~ to the eqnilibritim chara,.,"tcrization in Fig. 7 .3 . Fig. 7 .3 illtL~tratcs a unique HFT equilibritim for ns> l Oc.aa(iO. The 'd.o'INn'IN~mlly' directed triimglc from Fig. 7 .2 has increased in size and been replaced bywhat is virtually a hexagon ,ttm,tlllllingthe center in Fig. 7.3 . Finally, the five-edged area to the left in Fig. 7 .2 has become smaller and been replaced by the tinyFFF;LLF triangle to the left in Fig. 7.l , ttm, tlllllingthe point (45, 45, 0) .
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Jm/111(1 f ()r W()rkl-Syste/1£~ R<~W'(/1' (.'h The decrea,ingnrnnber of area, with multiple equilibria i, even more pronmmced in Fig. 7 3 than in Fig. >.2. For an increasing cost c ofprmh.tcingthe public goml one either gets ,miq,tc hegemony (if the , trict requirement i., metL a ,mique all-follower FFF scenario (if the strict requiremcrit i, not metL or an ,mlikdythird FFF'LLF option if two a,.,""ton. (e.g.
the LS and the EC) lruve sufficiently equal size, and the third actor ( e.g. Japan) lru, a size S<ITT!cicritly dose to zero.
A, the cost c ofprmh.tcingthepublic good increase, beyond c=(,, the JTF'LLF area (with the corresponding JTF'LFL and FFFTLL areas) vani.she,, which l:wpp;m at c=(,.I, (sin;x till., give, ! 0( c----c.
(2) t2=15 ). Furthennore, the tll'F urea ,lecrea,e, and the FFF area increase.-. For c->9 the entire triangle give, a ,mique FFF equihOrimn., whid1 mean, that the cost ofprmh.rcingthe public go;:xl i., too high. Decreasing the cost c ofprmh.tcingthe public good to c=3.(, results in the equilibrirnn d1ura,.,""terization in Fig. 7 .4 . Jouma ! of Wrx!d-System, Resmrch A<; c dccrca<;cs further, given 3<c<3 .6, the two trapezia HFF/LL F and FHF/LLF ( and their analogs) become narrower and gradually turn into parallelograms, the FFF/LLF parallelogram and the FFF triangle (and their analogs) gradually vanish, and the HFF/LLF/FHF triangle (and its analogs) becomes larger and gradually turns into a trapezium. For c=3 hegemony is possible for all combinations of O>=us,cc ,j<=90, where us+cc+j=90. More specifically, for c=3 the center 'upwardly' directed triangle stretching from us= lO(c+cT(2))/2=27 to the point (36, 27, 27) consists of thr ee sub-triangles and three sub-parallelograms. All these six area<; allow for the thr ee equilibria LLF, LFL, and FLL. Each sub-parallelogram also allows for one hegemonic option, the upp er one e.g. for HFF. Each sub-triangle also allows for two hegemonic options, the left one e.g. for HFF andFHF.
A<; c dccrca<;cs further to c=2.4, in which ca<;c 10c= lO(c+cT(2))/2=24, the ccntcrtrianglc gradually incrca<;cs in size to stretch from us=24 to the point (42, 24, 24) and gradually changes in content of equilibria to allow for all the six equilibria HFF, FHF, FFH, LLF, LFL, FLL. Simultaneously, the two parallelograms HFF/LLF and FHF/LLF (and their analogs) gradually vanish, being replaced by the HFF/LLF/FHF trap ezium ( and its analogs), which is incrca<;ing in size . The area for each uniqu e hegemonic equilibrium in each corner, e.g. HFF close to the upper point (90,0,0), also gradually dccrca<;cs in size.
Dccrca<;ing the cost c of producing the public good to c=l.8 results in the equilibrium characterization in Fig. 7 .5. Fig. 7 .5 is noteworthy since unilateral production of public goods, for c>2.4, is less costly for a single actor than half the cost of bilateral joint production of public goods . This constellation appears if c is smaller than CT. N everthele ss, joint leadership remains a viable option when two actors arc nearly equal in size.
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Dccrca<;in g c further to c=O moves the us= 1 Oc= 18 line in Fig. 7 .5 gradual ly downwards to the us= lOc=O line, while the us= lO(c+cT(2))/2 =2l linc in Fig. 7 .5 is moved gradually downward<; to the us=lO(c +c T(2})/2=12 lin c. A<; the reader can sec, each of the thre e corner parallelograms allows for all the three hegemonic options HFF, FHF, and FFH. Further, the center triangle gets larger, spanned by the points (66,12,12), (12, 66, 12) , and (l 2,12,66).
Analyzing the triangles in political terms lead<; to the following conclusions. The way an international public good will be produced greatly depends on the costs which arc necessary to produce it and on the rela tive size of the actors. Observe that in the discussion from c=3.6 in Fig. 7 .4, to c=3, then to c=2.4, then to c=l.8 in Fig. 7 .5, and fmallyto c=-0 in the pre"iOtL, paragraph, there i, a gradual increase in the number of multiple equilibria ill each oftl1e "arious areas. The 'cheaper' an i11temational pnblic good is, the easier it is to produce political soluti011,, bnt tl1e higher is the political coilflict resulting from the free-rider problem. Tili, i, tl1e re"erse effect, v.i1ich is c011,istc11t with the trend described abo"oe that the number of areas with mnltiple eqnilibria decreases as the cost c ofproduci11gthe pnblic good i11creases. TI1e reason i,, CO!l"'l!rscly, that botl1 the requireme11ts for hegemony amt joi11t leadership arc now less strict, as well as tl1at FFF i, still an opti011 if c>3 and the siz.!s oftl1e three actors arc sufficiently equal. fa otl1er wont,, for small cc,;ts c ofproducilig the pnb lie good, there arc mai1y possible leadership c011,tcllati011,, "'U. hegem011y(alway, possible given c<,~), or joi11t lea,Jcrship, or ai1 allfollower sitttati011 (ifno single actor is comparably large ai1d c>3). Even if there was a hypothetical intemati011al pnblic goc,.t tl1at ai1y comltty in the world was able to produce, it wonld still be possible for all cotnltries to stay aside. Extrcmclyexpci1sive il1tcniati011al pnblic goo1l, cai1 01lly be pro .... 'idcd by a hegem011. TI1e problem stcmmil1g from joi11t leadership in regard to costlypr0\.'isi011 of the public good i, tliattransacti011costs exceed the gail1.<; from j oi11t acti011. Any stylized model has it.., limitations. This model analyzes the problem of size in collective action. Its limitations mainly stem from the neglect of variations in the cost of providing international public goods. In the case of global economic crises, for instance, the transaction costs needed to reach an agreement may decrease considerably. Having learned the lessons from the disa..,trous economic consequences of the Great Depression in the 1930s, countries today may, when confronted with an economic threat of collapsing growth rates, incrca ... ing inflation and unemployment, more ea ... ily opt for joint leadership. On the other hand, the continuing integration of economic affairs leads to an increase in the price of policy changes. Our model allows for parametric changes of the cost c of producing public goods and transaction costs c T, but it docs not treat these a.., variables; the only variable in our model is size.
The strength of the model presented in this article is that it permits predictions of future leadership constellations in international political relations, given estimates of the sizes of the actors' economics, that is any combination (us,cc,j). It is also possible to assume other actors than us, cc, and j, and it is of course possible to increase the complexity of the model to four or more than four actors, although this will complicate the analysis.
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Predictions are necessarily speculative though not without precedent (Kennedy 1987; Gilpin 1987; Thurow 1992) . In this concluding section we discuss the relationship between actor size and the costs of providing an international public good. We have a ..,sumed (us,ec,j)=(50,35,5) in 1960, (us,ec,j) =(40,35,15) in 1975, and we may a . .. sum e (us,ec,j)=(38,35,18) in 1995. The relative sizes in 1975 and 1995 are sufficientl y similar so a.., to give no changes in the Na..,h equilibria. With the possible further size convergence of the three actors we may a',sumc (us,ec,j) = (35, 30, 25) , which would lead to a significant increa..,e in the degree of conflict about leadership. Future development may lead to the emergence of a 'Pacific bloc', pac, agreed upon either by the ASEAN and Japan, by the APEC, or by an other insti tutional form. Let us a . . . sum e (us,ec,pac)=(25,25,25), which lead.., to the game in Table 8 .1.
The game in Table 8 .1 resembles a three-person prisoners' dilemma. Everyone would benefit and recei ve a positiv e payoffO.l from LLL. However, each actor has an incentiv e to deviate unilaterally to F to receive the free-rider payoff2.5. If everyone deviates to F, however, the uniqu e mutual-defection equilibrium FFF ensues. Table 8 ,2 ilhistratcs frmr equilibria, LLF, LFL, FLL am! FFF, the fonncrthrec providing the pnblic good, Hence, a low cost c allow-s Jbr prndttcing tl1c public good since two actors tl1cn have an incentive to lead, The game for tl1c low-cost pnblic good, tl1creforc, docs not resemble a prisoners' dilemma, lmt rather a coonlination game. 
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Although the model used in this article has shown a multiplicity of equilibria allowing for hegemonic or joint leadership, the all-follower FFF equilibrium is also a prevalent option for c>3. Comparable to a hegemonic era where international public goods are produced with a high degree of certainty, our model predicts an increasing likelihood of international public goods not being produced if the sizes of the various actors converge. Thus, the most salient problem of contemporary and future world politics seems not to be hegemonic decline but rather the emergence and existence of multipl e joint-l eadership equilibria. If multiple constellations of joint leaders arc able to produce international public goods, the increasing number of available strategics for each actor easily leads to situations where international public goods turn out not to be producible. That is, the probability increases that the actors find themselves in a deadlock. The possibility of agreeing upon tripartite leadership does not necessarily resolve the deadlock, both because that leads to rising transaction costs and because one actor will have an incentive to free-ride in the sense of not contributing to the production of the public goods.
It is typically the case that expensive public goods arc much more likely to be provided by a hcgemon than by a group oflcaders. This is illustrated, for example, by Fig. 7.3 , which suggests that international public goods will be provided with probability one if the size of an actor is larger than 60 ( e.g. the HFF area), whereas both the all-follo wer FFF and the joint leader ship LLF options arc realizable equilibria if the US and the EC arc equally large and Japan is very small in size, say (us,ec 1 j)=(45,45,0). .
.
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Furthermore, given hegemonic decline and the emergence of joint leadership, the probability increases that the largest actor may be too small to provide costly international public goods unilaterally, while the followers are too small to join in the production. This is illustrated by the center portion of Fig. 7.4 . This is a plausible constellation if the second-and third-ranked actors arc almost equal in size. The increasing difficulty in producing expensive public goods may lead to a situation where the actors become less likely to agree upon the establishment of international regimes which arc broad in scope. One should expect, therefore, that the international regime s agreed upon by countries in the foreseeable future are more limited or scctorial in scope.
l . We would like to thank the National Bureau of Economic Research, which provides the scientific community with the public good of the Penn World Tables via the Intern et. Our thanks go also to Matthias Kenter, Institut dcr dcutschcn Wirtschaft, Cologne, for helpful hints concerning the data. For their various constructive comments we arc indebted to Margaret Levi, Matthias Mohr and Fritz W. Scharpf. 2_ . It is much disputed whether stabilized exchange rates arc to be considered a public good or public bad. We arc not concerned with this question , but in general we agree with the economic mainstream that fixed exchange rates arc a public bad while stabl e and stabilized exchange rates arc a public good .
.1. Confusingly, economists define this role as leadership, while int ernational relations scholars distinguish between a single leader, called hcgcmon, and a group oflcadcrs. These differences arc mainly ignored in economic theory. However, as we show later, th e analytical separation of hcgcmons and leaders docs make sense. Ther efore, we rigidly differentiate between a single leader, referred to as a hcgcmon , and multiple joint leaders .
.± . For the suggestion that there is a continuum between pure public and pure private goods rather than a dichotomy, sec Bruce Russett ( 1987: 225). 2:. We will discuss and amend this assumption in sections 5 and 7.
6. W c have experimented with logistic functions of arbitrary compl exity for the transaction costs, which do not change the nature of the results.
7.
We acknowledge the critique of John Ruggic (1982) and David Lake (1984) that relative size can explain only the necessary, but not the sufficient, conditions for the emergence of a lib eral international economy. We nevert heless think it makes sense to provide international relations scholars with the analytical tools to analyze the politicalcconomic consequences of size within the game -theoretic approach to international politic s .
.8. . The Penn World Tables, also known as the Summers-Heston Tables, display a set of national accounts economic time-series covering a large number of countries. It is an attempt to get closer to a system ofrcal national accounts, and its unique feature is that it allows for int ernational, not just intcrtcmporal, comparisons (Summers / Heston 1991).
9.
It is debatable whether the EC ( or an equivalent thereof) had the strategic capability of acting as an actor in the 1950s and early 1960s. An interes ting discussion of whether corporate actors, coalitions, collective actors, and aggregate actors can be treated as unitary players applicable for game -theoretic analysis is provided by Scharpf (l 99 l ). It might be argued that the EC until the early 1960s was an aggregate actor with out strategic capabili ty and thus only capable of choosing the strategy of followin g, wh ich prov ides further support for th e early [H,F,F] equilib rium. However, the early EC consisted of certain dominan t subactors such as Germany, France, and the UK, which either alone or through some mechanism of tacit self-coo rdination could engag e in strategic action. This justifies considering the EC as an actor in its own right as early as the 1950s .
.1Q,_ Sec also James Morrow (1994a) for an integration of coercive and benevolent leadership. Note that our model differs from Morrow's model, even though we agree that leaders need not be superior. We assume that they mw;t have a minimum size, which is determined by the cost of the public good. Therefore, actors can be leaders in one issuearea while they fail to lead in another.
1L For a more general discussion of whether actors have the incentives to punish dcviators to ensure cooperation or rule compliance, sec Richerson (1985, 1992) .
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